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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












CITY OF YORK; 
THE HONORABLE JOHN S. BRENNER, Mayor, 
Individually and as Mayor for the City of York; 
MARK L. WHITMAN, Individually and as 
Police Commissioner for the City of York; 
WESLEY KAHLEY, Individually and as 
Police Captain of Operations for the City of York; 
POLICE OFFICER A. BAEZ, Badge Number 192, 
Individually and as a Police Officer for the City of York; 
THE COUNTY OF YORK; 
H. STANLEY REBERT, Individually and as 
District Attorney for the County of York 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-08-cv-01879) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 




OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, plaintiff Charlotte Bergdoll 
appeals from the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to York City Police Officer 
Andrew Baez, the County of York, the City of York, and various city and county 
officials.  We will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual 
context and legal history of this case, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
On October 12, 2006, Officer Andrew Baez responded to a dispatch call to check 
on the welfare of children living at 745 West Poplar Street in York, Pennsylvania.  When 
he arrived at the residence, Officer Baez met the tenant, a woman named Cassandra 
Whitted.  A short time later, Charlotte Bergdoll, who worked for Cherry Lane Realty as 
the manager of the property, arrived at the residence. 
The parties present different accounts of what happened next.  At his deposition, 
Officer Baez testified that Bergdoll started yelling and directing profanities at him and 
Whitted, and that he then told Bergdoll that she had to leave the residence.  Bergdoll 
denies using profanity but does admit that she questioned why Officer Baez was 
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investigating housing codes issues and asked him whom he was “screwing.”  Officer 
Baez then told Bergdoll that she was under arrest.  Bergdoll claims that she immediately 
stopped and put her hands behind her back in order to be handcuffed, but that Officer 
Baez then pushed her to the ground and kneeled on top of her back while she screamed 
for help.  Officer Baez testified that Bergdoll pulled away from him while he was leading 
her onto the property‟s porch, that she resisted arrest while the two struggled on the 
porch, and that he finally had to put Bergdoll to the ground and call for back-up while 
Bergdoll continued to scream and resist.  In any event, after a second officer arrived on 
the scene, Bergdoll was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. 
At the police station, Bergdoll filed a private citizen complaint against Officer 
Baez, which was investigated by William Follmer of the York City Police Department 
Internal Affairs Department.  After Folmer left Internal Affairs, the file was reviewed by 
Philip Roberts, who testified at his deposition that there was nothing in Officer Baez‟s 
history that would have alerted anyone to his being prone to the use of excessive force or 
to violating citizens‟ rights. 
Assistant District Attorney Laurence Stone was assigned by District Attorney H. 
Stanley Rebert to handle Bergdoll‟s trial for disorderly conduct.  Bergdoll was eventually 
tried and acquitted of the disorderly conduct charge.  Stone testified at his deposition that 
he had not been specifically instructed by the District Attorney‟s office as to how to 
handle the case and that his decision not to drop the charges against Bergdoll was an 
exercise of his own discretion. 
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On October 10, 2008, Bergdoll brought the present lawsuit against Officer Baez, 
the City of York, the County of York, Police Commissioner Mark Whitman, and Police 
Captain of Operations Wesley Kahley.  In her amended complaint, Bergdoll alleged, 
under § 1983, violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, along with related state law claims.
1
  On April 27, 2011, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to all defendants except Officer Baez on all of Bergdoll‟s claims, and 
to Officer Baez on all claims but Bergdoll‟s allegation of excessive force under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Bergdoll v. City of York, No. 3:08-CV-1879, 2011 WL 1601605, at 
*10 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2011).  The remaining claim proceeded to a jury trial, and on 
November 3, 2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Officer Baez. 
Bergdoll‟s timely appeal to this Court followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district court‟s 
decision to grant a motion for summary judgment.  Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 
163, 165 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
                                              
1
 On appeal, Bergdoll does not challenge the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment to defendants on her state law claims. 
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non-moving party, who is entitled to “all reasonable inferences from the record.”  Liberty 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. 
A. 
We first consider Bergdoll‟s claims against Officer Baez.  Bergdoll argues that the 
District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to Officer Baez on qualified 
immunity grounds on Bergdoll‟s claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.
2
  We disagree. 
1. 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Officer Baez on 
Bergdoll‟s claims of Fourth Amendment false arrest.  To prevail on a claim of false arrest 
under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that she was arrested without probable cause.  
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Dowling v. City 
of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim 
based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense 
                                              
2
 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Because we hold that Officer Baez did not violate 
Bergdoll‟s constitutional rights, we need not consider whether those rights were “clearly 
established.”  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (“If no constitutional right would 
have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further 
inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”). 
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but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had 
committed the offense.”).  Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy 
information or circumstances within a police officer‟s knowledge are sufficient to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by 
the person being arrested.”  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).  
The validity of an arrest is determined by the law of the state where the arrest occurred.  
Id. 
The record supports the District Court‟s conclusion that Officer Baez had probable 
cause to arrest Bergdoll for disorderly conduct.
3
  Although Bergdoll denies using 
profanity during her encounter with Officer Baez, she does admit that her arrest followed 
a “period of arguing” during which Bergdoll questioned Officer Baez as to whom he was 
“screwing.”  We agree with the District Court that given the situation and Bergdoll‟s 
                                              
3
 In Pennsylvania, “[a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to 
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he 
(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; (2) makes 
unreasonable noise; (3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or 
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose of the actor.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503(a) (2012). 
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“hostile and confrontational language,” Bergdoll, 2011 WL 1601605, at *5, Officer Baez 




The District Court also properly granted summary judgment to Officer Baez on 
Bergdoll‟s claim of First Amendment retaliation.  In order to prevail on such a claim, a 
plaintiff must prove “(1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that 
the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the 
retaliation.”  Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).  “[U]pon a 
prima facie showing of retaliatory harm, the burden shifts to the defendant official to 
demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action 
complained of.”  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006). 
Bergdoll argues that her statements regarding “the police role in codes issues,” 
combined with Officer Baez‟s “personal ill-will” toward her, resulted in her retaliatory 
arrest on disorderly conduct charges.  But as the District Court correctly held, Bergdoll‟s 
claim fails because she cannot show that her speech was the but-for cause of her arrest.  
Although her speech was protected and she was arrested a short time after making her 
                                              
4
 Our judgment is based on the totality of the circumstances and not solely on the 
obviously offensive and insulting question to Officer Baez about whom he was 
„screwing.‟  Because the District Court did not err in holding that Officer Baez had 
probable cause, Bergdoll‟s claim for malicious prosecution also fails.  See Kossler v. 
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (“To prove malicious prosecution under 
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that . . . the proceeding was initiated without probable cause 
. . . .”). 
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remarks, the record supports the District Court‟s conclusion that it was Bergdoll‟s 
“aggressive and confrontational behavior,” Bergdoll, 2011 WL 1601605, at *6, not her 
speech, that prompted her arrest. 
3. 
Nor did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Officer Baez on 
Bergdoll‟s claims under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  As the District Court noted, Bergdoll‟s Fifth Amendment claim fails 
because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials, 
and Officer Baez is a state official.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 719 
F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983).  Bergdoll‟s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
claim fails because her claims of excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution 
are cognizable under the Fourth Amendment, and “when government behavior is 
governed by a specific constitutional amendment, due process analysis is inappropriate.”  
Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000).  See id. at 268-69 
(“Although not all actions by police officers are governed by the Fourth Amendment, . . . 
 9 
the constitutionality of arrests by state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment 
rather than due process analysis.”).5 
4. 
We also reject Bergdoll‟s claim that Officer Baez‟s actions violated her rights 
under the Eighth Amendment.  Bergdoll accurately quotes our decision in Howell v. 
Cataldi for the proposition that police conduct that “exceeds that which is reasonable and 
necessary under the circumstances, and also violates standards of decency more or less 
universally accepted” can give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983.  464 
F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But the Eighth 
Amendment only serves as a “primary source of substantive protection” after conviction, 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), and the conduct complained of by 
Bergdoll occurred prior to and during her arrest.  See also Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 
150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment‟s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
                                              
5
 Bergdoll also asserts that her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
was violated when her “statements prior to, during, and after her arrest, as well as 
information gathered from the citizen‟s complaint she filed” were used in connection 
with her trial for disorderly conduct.  But Bergdoll offers no evidence that her statements 
prior to and during her arrest, or those taken from her citizen‟s complaint, were 
“compelled” within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.  See U.S. Const., 
amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . .”).  Nor does Bergdoll offer any evidence of any compelled statements that 
were used against her in any criminal or civil proceedings.  See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 
U.S. 760, 776 (2003) (finding no constitutional violation where plaintiff was interrogated 
after being shot during altercation with police, but he was never charged with a crime and 
his statements were never used against him in any criminal proceeding). 
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Clause does not apply until „after sentence and conviction.‟” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. 
at 392 n.6)). 
B. 
Bergdoll also argues that the District Court erred when it granted summary 
judgment to the County, the City, Whitman, and Kahley.  We disagree. 
1. 
As the District Court found, Bergdoll‟s allegations against the County can be read 
as asserting two basic claims: first, that the County is responsible for the actions of 
Officer Baez, and second, that the County violated Bergdoll‟s rights by establishing a 
policy of ignoring citizen complaints against the police department.  Neither claim has 
any merit. 
Although municipalities such as the County qualify as “persons” under § 1983, 
they cannot be held liable for their employees‟ actions on a theory of respondeat 
superior.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).  Rather, a plaintiff 
seeking relief from a municipality under § 1983 must identify a particular “policy or 
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 
said to represent official policy,” and show that the policy in question directly led to the 
complained-of injury.  Id. at 694. 
Bergdoll‟s first claim against the County – that it bears responsibility for the 
actions of Officer Baez – fails for two reasons.  First, Bergdoll has offered no evidence of 
any policy or custom on the part of the County that led to her injury.  Second, even if 
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Bergdoll could make such a showing, her claim of Monell liability would still fail 
because, as outlined above, Officer Baez‟s actions did not violate any of Bergdoll‟s 
constitutional rights.
6
  See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per 
curiam) (“[N]either Monell . . . nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of 
damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers 
when . . . the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”). 
Bergdoll‟s second claim against the County – that it violated her rights by 
establishing a policy of ignoring citizen complaints against the police department – fails 
because, as the District Court found, Bergdoll offers no evidence that the District 
Attorney‟s office improperly ignored her citizen complaint, much less that they had a 
policy of doing so. 
2. 
Bergdoll argues that the City bears responsibility for the alleged constitutional 
violations committed by Officer Baez because it had a “policy of not properly 
investigating citizen complaints, formal and informal, and failing to reprimand and 
discipline officers involved in abuse.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 12.  As for Whitman and 
Kahley, Bergdoll claims that the two men qualify as “policymakers” under Pembaur v. 
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), and therefore bear liability for her constitutional 
                                              
6
 To the extent that Bergdoll‟s opening brief can also be read to challenge the 
jury‟s verdict in favor of Officer Baez on Bergdoll‟s claim of excessive force, we reject 
any such challenge because Bergdoll has failed to present any evidence calling the 
verdict into question. 
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injuries, because “Kahley had final decision-making authority regarding the outcome of 
citizen complaints and [Whitman] was the final authority for all police department 
issues.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 7.  Therefore, Bergdoll argues, Whitman and Kahley bear 
responsibility for the City‟s alleged violation of her “rights to a fair and judicious citizen 
complaint procedure and to be heard and have the brutality she experienced examined.”  
Id. at 16. 
After reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that Bergdoll has 
failed to present evidence to support her claims.  Bergdoll‟s allegations against the City 
based on the actions of Officer Baez fail for two reasons: first, because Officer Baez did 
not violate any of Bergdoll‟s constitutional rights, see Heller, 475 U.S. at 799; and 
second, because Bergdoll has not presented any evidence that the City was deliberately 
indifferent in its training of Officer Baez in proper police procedure, see City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).  As for Bergdoll‟s claims against Whitman and 
Kahley, the record supports the District Court‟s conclusion that Bergdoll failed to present 
evidence that the men were policymakers under Pembaur or, in any event, that any of 
Bergdoll‟s constitutional rights were violated. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
